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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court's jurisdiction rests upon Utah Code Ann. sec. 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court err in granting Defendant/Appellee RB&G Engineering, 
Inc.'s March 8, 2005 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment holding that Sunridge 
Enterprises, LLC cannot recover damages for its inability to sell the "lost" 14 units 
stemming from RB&G's failures in their 1993 and 1995 reports? 
Standard of Review: De novo. By definition, "a district court does not resolve 
issues of fact at summary judgment/' therefore, this Court "considers] the record 
as a whole and review[s] the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, 
reciting all facts and fair inferences drawn from the record in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party." Poteet v. White, 147 P.3d 439, 441 (Utah 
2006). 
Preservation for Appeal: R. at 383-90. 
ISSUE 2: Did the trial court err in granting Defendant/Appellees RB&G Engineering, 
Inc.'s March 8, 2005 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment holding that the economic 
loss mle barred Plaintiffs Sunridge Development Corporation's negligence claims? 
Standard of Review: De novo. By definition, "a district court does not resolve 
issues of fact at summary judgment," therefore, this Court "considers] the record 
as a whole and review[s] the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, 
reciting all facts and fair inferences drawn from the record in the light most 
2 
favorable to the nonmoving party." Poteet v. White, 147 P.3d 439, 441 (Utah 
2006). 
Preservation for Appeal: R. at 385-87. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Sunridge Development Corporation ("Development Corp.") 
and Sunridge Enterprises, LLC ("Enterprises") filed suit on February 5, 2003, alleging 
negligence and breach of contract against Defendant/Appellee RB&G Engineering, Inc. 
(R. atl.) 
RB&G filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Partial Summary Judgment on 
March 8, 2005. (R. at 225.) The trial court heard arguments on the motion on July 29, 
2005, and in its August 2,2005 ruling, it granted RB&G's motion for partial summary 
judgment, holding that (1) Development Corp. and Enterprises could not maintain their 
independent negligence claims, and (2) the economic loss rule, as well as lack of 
contractual privity between Enterprises and RB&G, precluded Enterprises from 
recovering for the inability to develop 14 units as a result of RB&G's admitted failure to 
identify geologic faults in the development. (R. at 538.) 
The parties subsequently stipulated to dismiss the remaining claims (r. at 736), and 
Development Corp. and Enterprises filed the instant appeal which addresses solely the 
trial court's August 2, 2005 ruling. 
4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In March 1969, Stephen Stewart ("Stewart") formed Plaintiff/Appellant Sunridge 
Development Corporation ("Development Corp."). (R. at 368, 392.) Stewart is a 
principal of Development Corp. (R. at 392.) 
Several years later, in 1981, Development Corp. purchased an 87-acre parcel in 
the City of Provo, 10.2 acres of which would later become the Alpine Brook development 
("Property"), the property at issue in this case. (R. at 373.) 
Development Corp. Commissions the First Geologic Report 
In 1993, prior to developing the Property, Development Corp. contracted with 
RB&G to perform, inter alia, a geologic study of the Property. (R. at 392-93.) On June 
23, 1993, RB&G submitted its report (in the form of a two-page letter, excluding attached 
maps) to Development Corp. ("1993 Report"), and RB&G invoiced Development Corp. 
for the analysis. (R. at 370.) The 1993 Report analyzed potential faults and other 
geologic features of the Property. (R. at 284.) It states, in part, that "the faults depicted 
on the map [attached to the Report] do not necessarily exist" and that "[tjhere is a real 
possibility that these faults represent linear features which were misidentified by 
previous investigators." (R. at 285 (emphases added).) 
Development Corp. Commissions Another Geologic Report 
Two years later, in 1995, Development Corp. again commissioned RB&G, via oral 
contract, to conduct a geotechnical investigation of the Property. (R. at 370, 393.) 
Development Corp. wanted RB&G to determine whether geological hazards existed 
5 
throughout the Property and to provide recommendations for foundation design. (R. at 
393.) On August 4, 1995, RB&G provided Development Corp. with its report ("1995 
Report"). (R. at 291, 370.) The 1995 Report provided, in part, that there were only small 
faults on the Property, but that such faults were expected for the area and that the faults 
would not pose development problems. (R. at 10.) Based on RB&G's two evaluations 
and recommendations, Development Corp. proceeded with the Property's development. 
(R. at 10.) 
Development Corp. Organizes Then Sells the Property to its Sister Entity, 
Plaintiff/Appellant Sunridge Enterprises, LLC ("Enterprises") 
In March 1996, Stephen Stewart formed Plaintiff/Appellant Sunridge Enterprises, 
LLC ("Enterprises"). (R. at 368-69.) Stewart is a principal of Enterprises, just as he is a 
principal of Development Corp. (R. at 392.) 
In 1996, based on the 1993 and 1995 Reports, Development Corp. conveyed the 
Property to Enterprises for development. (R. at 393.) At the time of the sale, based on 
the 1993 and 1995 Reports, the Property would accommodate 86 units. (R. at 393.) 
In conjunction with Development Corp.'s conveyance of the Property to 
Enterprises, Development Corp. also assigned and transferred all of its rights and claims 
regarding the various engineering reports, surveys, studies, and zoning approvals, etc., to 
Enterprises. (R. at 393.) 
6 
Enterprises Continues to Develop the Property but Is Forced to Redesign the Property to 
Accommodate Newly Discovered Faults that RB&G's Reports Missed 
Subsequently, Enterprises continued to develop the Property, including applying 
for the required permits from Provo City. (R. at 393-94.) Then, on October 27, 1998, 
Richard Giraud of the Utah Geological Survey sent the City of Provo a letter discussing 
concerns he had with the 1993 and 1995 Reports, including a recommendation that 
"further evaluation of surface fault rupture is necessary, and that slope-stability, debris-
flow, flooding, and rock-fall hazards [must] be addressed." (R. at 394, 435.) The Utah 
Geological Association ("UGA") ^aumcvom^fm^d ^Miiori^1 testing, which—when 
performed—uncovered faults that RB&G missed in its 1993 and 1995 Reports. (R. at 
384.) 
Based on the UGA's discoveries, Provo City required, among other things, that 
certain fault set-backs be incorporated into the Property's design. (R. at 384.) 
Additionally, Provo City officials stopped the Property's development at various times 
from 1996 forward until Enterprises redesigned the Property to accommodate the faults. 
(R. at 394-35.) 
This redesign and the set-back reduced the number of developable units by 14, 
amounting to a loss of $1,057,983.41. (R. at 395.) Had Development Corp. or 
Enterprises known about the faults in 1993 or 1995, it would have designed the Property 
such that the fault areas could have been open space, such as parks, roads, or storm 
retention areas. (R. at 395-96.) By the time the mistake was discovered, the first phase 
of the development was almost complete, and the road location could not be moved. Id. 
7 
Development Corp. and Enterprises Suffers Additional Losses Based on Their Reliance 
on the 1993 and 1995 Reports 
Development of the Property suffered due to Development Corp. and Enterprises' 
reliance on the 1993 and 1995 Reports. (R. at 396.) For example, the state engineer had 
to conduct additional inspections, leading to delays. (R. at 396.) The whole development 
shut down during these delays. (R. at 396.) 
Additionally, both Development Corp. and Enterprises suffered additional losses 
because of their reliance on the 1993 and 1995 Reports. These losses are detailed below.1 
ENTITY 
Enterprises 
Development Corp. 
Development Corp. 
Development Corp., 
Enterprises 
Development Corp., 
Enterprises 
Enterprises 
Development Corp., 
Enterprises 
Enterprises 
Development Corp. 
Enterprises 
CATEGORY 
Lost 14 units 
Payroll 
Trenching and 
backfilling studies 
Office and overhead 
Utilities 
Additional RB&G 
reports/tests 
Attorneys' fees 
Attorneys' fees 
Property redesign 
Landscaping/grading 
the fault zone 
TOTAL: 
AMOUNT 
$1,057,983.41 
$612,186 
$3150 
$9500 
$3300 
$35,589 
$4891 
$285 
$675 
$18,000 
$1,745,559.41 
CITATION 
R. at 395 
R. at 396 
R. at 397 
R. at 397 
R. at 397 
R. at 397 j 
R. at 398 
R. at 398 
R. at 398 
R. at 398 
Based on these damages, Development Corp. and Enterprises brought suit on 
February 5, 2003. (R. at 1.) 
1
 Only the first category of damages (the lost 14 units) is at issue in this appeal. 
The remaining issues have been resolved. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court incorrectly concluded there were no genuine issues of material fact 
based on the following. 
First, Enterprises can recover the lost revenue from the undevelopable 14 units 
because Development Corp.'s assignment to Enterprises of all Development Corp.'s 
rights vis-a-vis the RB&G contracts, which puts Enterprises and RB&G in privity of 
contract. When an assignor assigns its interest in a contract, the assignor loses privity 
with the original obligor, but the assignee gains privity with the original obligor. This 
occurred in the instant case. 
Second, the SME Industries case does not preclude recovery of the 14 units. 
RB&G and the trial court misunderstood the facts of that case and the fact that SME, the 
assignee on a contract, was limited to the assignor's damages (only $150,000) because 
the assignor had already incurred a maximum of $150,000 in damages. Thus, that was all 
SME could recover. 
Third, alternatively, if the Court finds no privity between Enterprises and RB&G, 
then Development Corp. remains in privity of contract with RB&G, and Development 
Corp. can recover consequential damages pursuant to RB&G's conceded breach. 
Fourth, even if the economic loss rule applies to Development Corp.'s negligence 
claim against RB&G, the Court should establish that professional engineers, like RB&G, 
have an independent duty to competently and thoroughly perform their duties. The Utah 
Supreme Court left as an open question whether professionals like engineers are subject 
9 
to this independent duty, and this case presents a ripe opportunity for the Court to prevent 
the erosion of tort liability by establishing an independent duty for professional engineers 
when they are not in privity of contract with the injured party. 
Professional engineers are in a position to foresee that negligence on their part will 
result in substantial economic and non-economic damages for their clients. Additionally, 
parties rely upon engineers' esoteric knowledge and expertise, and engineers know that. 
Finally, there is an information asymmetry between professional engineers and their 
clients such that their clients are forced to rely upon the engineers to accurately and 
thoroughly complete their tasks. Courts across the country are increasingly limiting the 
application of the economic loss rule since it effectively extinguishes tort claims. The 
poison pill that is the economic loss rule is admittedly valuable in some contexts, but the 
courts should limit its application. 
Last, if the Court declines to find for Development Corp. and Enterprises on the 
other issues, the Court should exercise its broad equitable power and allow Development 
Corp. and Enterprises to recover damages. Otherwise, RB&G's liability disappears, and 
it is liability proof in spite of its negligence and breaches. The Court should not allow 
RB&G to escape liability through this legal black hole. 
10 
ARGUMENT 
L STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may not grant summary 
judgment unless the moving party establishes "[1] that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and [2] that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). When a court addresses a motion for summary judgment, the 
court's function is not to weigh disputed evidence or to decide which side has the 
stronger case. Rather, the court's "sole inquiry should be whether material issues of fact 
exist." Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995). 
On a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party is not required to 
"prove" its case in order to defeat the motion. Rather, the nonmoving party is only 
required to submit evidence "sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact." Kleinert v. 
Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In addition, if there is 
"any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the doubt should be resolved in 
favor of the opposing party [and] the court must evaluate all the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment." Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 
1982). Finally, the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed for purposes of the 
motion, and if there is a conflict in the evidence as to a material fact, the motion must be 
denied. See, e.g., Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1100-01. 
11 
Based on this standard and the evidence presented below, disputed issues of fact 
necessitate this Court reversing the trial court's award of partial summary judgment to 
RB&G. 
IL ENTERPRISES CAN RECOVER DAMAGES FOR THE LOST 14 UNITS 
BECAUSE THE ASSIGNMENT FROM DEVELOPMENT CORP. TO 
ENTERPRISES CREATED PRIVITY BETWEEN ENTERPRISES AND 
RB&G. 
In 1996, when Development Corp. sold the Property to Enterprises, Development 
Corp. also assigned its universe of rights and claims regarding, among others, the various 
engineering reports, surveys, studies, and zoning approvals. (R. at 393.) So Enterprises 
"stands in the shoes" of Development Corp. with respect to all rights, duties, and 
obligations Development Corp. held. By virtue of this assigmnent, there is privity 
between Enterprises and RB&G, and therefore, Enterprises can recover the loss for the 14 
units. 
A. An Assignment Creates Privity Between the Assignee and the Remaining 
Obligor on the Contract. 
Under Utah law, an assigmnent operates to create privity between the assignee and 
the original obligor on a contract. The Utah Supreme Court explicitly so held in Spears 
v. Warr, in which the defendants, the Warrs, sold certain real property to the Crittendens 
via warranty deed. 44 P.3d 742, 746 (Utah 2002) (overruled on other grounds by RHN 
Corp, v. Veibell, 96 P.3d 935 (Utah 2004)). The Warrs represented to the Crittendens 
that the sale included irrigation rights on the property, but after the sale, they refused to 
honor that representation, and unfortunately, the deed did not contain the agreement 
. 12 
concerning irrigation. Id. at 746-47. Subsequently, the Crittendens sold the property to 
the Lewises, one of the plaintiffs. Id. at 747 n.5. In addition, the Crittendens also 
quitclaimed any and all water rights which the Lewises had in the property. Id. 
The plaintiffs, including the Lewises, sued the Warrs, and the trial court held for 
the plaintiffs, ordering the Warrs to convey irrigation rights to all the plaintiffs. Id. at 
747. The Warrs appealed several issues, the relevant issue for the instant case being 
whether "the Lewises lacked privity of contract to sue the Warrs." Id. at 754. 
The Warrs argued the quitclaim deed to the Lewises for the irrigation rights was 
not an assignment, and therefore, the Lewises had no contractual claim against the Warrs. 
Id. The Lewises countered by arguing they "are successors to the Crittenden's claims 
because the Crittendens, by quitclaim deed, conveyed all of their interests in the irrigation 
water to the Lewises." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court squarely addressed the issue and recognized that the 
quitclaim deed assigned not only all water rights in the property, but any and all 
contractual claims against the Warrs. Id. The court held, therefore, that "the Lewises 
[were] entitled to bring against the Warrs any contractual action the Crittenden's [sic] 
could have brought, including the instant claim for the irrigation water rights." Id. at 755 
(emphasis added). In other words, the assignment put the Warrs and the Lewises in 
privity of contract. 
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R Applying Spears to the Instant Case, it is Clear that Enterprises Took All 
the Rights and Benefits Development Corp. Held Under the Contracts with 
RB&G—Including the Right to Sue for Breach of Contract—and Nothing 
Less. 
As applied to the instant case, Spears resolves the issue of whether Enterprises is 
in privity with RB&G and whether Enterprises can recover damages for the lost revenue 
from the undevelopable 14 units. Clearly, in light of Spears, Enterprises is privity with 
RB&G as a result of Development Corp.'s assignment of "all of its rights and claims 
regarding the various engineering reports, surveys, studies, and zoning approvals . . . ." 
(R. at 393.) And just as in Spears, Enterprises can bring any contractual action against 
RB&G that Development Corp. could have brought, Spears, AA P.3d at 755, because 
Enterprises stands in the shoes of Development Corp. subsequent to the assignment. 
In other words, in a legal sense, an assigmnent is of no consequence to the original 
obligor on the contract; the original obligor's duties, rights, responsibilities, and liabilities 
remain unchanged regardless of an assignment. Id. Were it otherwise, an assignor's 
assignment would vitiate the original obligor's duties, obligations, and liabilities under a 
contract, leaving the assignee without the bargained-for rights and benefits under the 
original terms of the contract. Thus, under RB&G's view of this issue, with each 
assigmnent, an assignee would not receive 100% of the rights and benefits under the 
assigned contract because the original obligor somehow would have shed some of its 
obligations and liabilities pursuant to the assignment. This understanding of contract 
assigmnent would not put the assignee in the shoes of the assignor, as intended, but 
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would re-draft the contract with each assignment, chipping away at the assignee's rights 
each time. 
Since assignment language in the quitclaim deed put the Warrs and the Lewises in 
privity of contract, the Lewises could sue the Warrs for breach of contract. Similarly, 
since the assigmnent from Development Corp. to Enterprises of all Development Corp.'s 
"rights and claims regarding the various engineering reports, surveys, studies, and zoning 
approvals, etc." put Enterprises and RB&G in privity of contract, Enterprises can sue 
RB&G for breach of contract. 
Black's Law Dictionary also supports this position. Its defines "privity of 
contract" as "[t]he relationship between the parties to a contract, allowing them to sue 
each other but preventing a third party from doing so." Black's Law Dictionary 556 (2d 
pocketed. 2001). 
Therefore, since the assignment put Enterprises and RB&G in privity, any 
damages that were Development Corp.'s became Enterprises'. Additionally, any 
damages subsequent to the assignment remained with Enterprises. In either case, 
Enterprises could sue RB&G for breach of contract provided Enterprises could satisfy the 
elements for breach of contract. 
C RB&G Breached its 1993 and 1995 Contracts with Development Corp. 
(and by Virtue of the Assignment, with Enterprises). 
From the time of the 1996 Property sale and assignment of rights from 
Development Corp. to Enterprises, Enterprises "owned" all of Development Corp.'s 
rights under Development Corp.'s various contracts with RB&G. In a legal sense, the 
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assigmnent made no difference from RB&G's perspective. It rights, duties, obligations, 
and liabilities never changed. And once Enterprises discovered in 1998 that RB&G 
breached its contract by, inter alia, failing to identify the faults on the Property, a cause 
of action accrued. See, e.g., Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Utah 1993) ("A 
cause of action accrues when the last event necessary to complete the legal claim 
occurs."). 
Specifically, Enterprises discovered the breach in 1998 (after the 1996 
assigmnent) when Richard Giraud of the Utah Geological Survey sent the City of Provo a 
letter detailing the discrepancies between RB&G's reports and the actual faults on the 
Property. (R. at 384.) The Utah Geological Association ("UGA") then recommended 
additional testing, which uncovered faults that RB&G missed in its 1993 and 1995 
Reports. (R. at 384.) Based on the UGA's discoveries, Provo City required, among other 
things, that certain fault set-backs be incorporated into the Property's design. (R. at 384.) 
Those set-backs ultimately covered or infringed on the so-called "lost" 14 units (i.e., the 
number of developable units was reduced by 14). (R. at 384, 396.) 
IX RB&G's Breach Damaged Enterprises by Precluding Enterprises from 
Selling the Lost 14 Units. 
As a result of the lost 14 units, Enterprises lost the revenue those lots would have 
generated, which amounts to $1,057,983.41. (R. at 396.) This constitutes part of 
Enterprises' and Development Corp.'s damages (since Enterprises, the Property's 
purchaser, was supposed to pay Development Corp. for the units once they sold). (R. at 
396.) 
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Indeed, RB&G admitted its breach at the summary judgment hearing. RB&G, in 
arguing Enterprises could not assert a breach of contract claim against RB&G, said "the 
difference here, your Honor, is the contract was fully performed and breached before the 
assignment occurs." (R. at 744, p. 52 (emphasis added).) A moment later, he reiterated: 
"so when [the contracts were] assigned, [they 're] breached contract[s]'." (R. at 744, p. 
52 (emphasis added).) 
Thus, all the elements of a breach of contract claim (a contract, performance by 
the party seeking recovery, breach by the other party, and damages, see, e.g., Eleopulos v. 
McFarland & Hullinger, LLC, 145 P.3d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 2006)) are met in this case. 
At the very minimum, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Development Corp. 
and Enterprises, there exist issues of material facts that necessitate reversing the trial 
court's grant of RB&G's motion for partial summary judgment. 
IIL THE SME INDUSTRIES CASE APPLIES, BUT THE TRIAL COURT AND 
RB&G MISINTERPRETED AND MISTAKENLY RELIED UPON IT. 
At the summary judgment hearing, the trial court and RB&G engaged in a lengthy 
dialogue about privity of contract and how SME Indus., Inc. v. Hiompson, Ventulett, 
Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 28 P.3d 669 (Utah 2001) applies to the instant case. (R. at 
744, pp. 39-63.) This colloquy lasted for quite some time, and the trial court patiently 
listened to RB&G's arguments that, based on SME, Enterprises and RB&G were not in 
privity of contract (in spite of the assignment), and that as a result, Enterprises could not 
sue RB&G for breach of contract and thereby recover damages for the lost 14 units. (R. 
at 744, pp. 39-63.) 
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After reading the hearing transcript (or, even better, listening to the recording), it 
is clear that RB&G's arguments contradicted the court's intuition and understanding of 
contract assignment, and the court repeatedly asked RB&G why the assignment failed to 
put Enterprises and RB&G in privity. (R. at 744, pp.41-63.) RB&G incorrectly told the 
court that "[tjhat's exactly what the Utah Supreme Court said in the SME case." (R. at 
744, p. 41.) 
SME does not stand for the proposition that Enterprises is not in privity with 
RB&G, or that Enterprises cannot recover damages for breach of contract from RB&G, 
regardless of when the breach occurred. Rather, SME supports Enterprises5 position that 
Enterprises "stands in the shoes" of Development Corp. and can exercise Development 
Corp.'s universe of rights and benefits conferred upon it by virtue of the contracts with 
RB&G. 
A thorough review of the SME case is necessary before understanding how it 
instructs the instant case. 
A. The SME Industries Case. 
In 1992, Salt Lake County ("SLCo.") entered into a contract for architectural 
services with Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Associates, Inc. ("TVSA") to renovate 
and expand the Salt Palace in Salt Lake City. SME Indus., 28 P.3d at 672. TVSA then 
subcontracted with two other firms, Gillies, Stransky, Brems & Smith ("GSBS") and 
Reaveley Engineers & Associates, Inc. ("Reaveley") (the three entities collectively 
known as "the design team") that would provide engineering services, but those entities 
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did not directly contract with SLCo. Id. Thus, there was no privity between SLCo. and 
GSBS or SLCo. and Reaveley. 
SLCo. 
CONTRACT 
TVSA 
/ \ 
GSBS Reaveley 
Two years later, in 1994, independent from the SLCo-TVSA contract, SLCo. 
contracted with Hughes-Hunt ("Hughes-Hunt") to act as the general contractor on the 
project. Id. Hughes-Hunt then separately contracted with SME Industries, Inc. ("SME") 
to furnish, fabricate, and erect the structural steel for the project. Id. Similar to GSBS 
and Reaveley, SME did not directly contract with SLCo. Id. Thus, there was no privity 
between SLCo. and SME. 
SLCo. 
CONTRACT 
W 
HUGHES- 1 
HUNT | 
K 
SME 
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Shortly after beginning work on the project, SME encountered problems with the 
structural portions of the plans as prepared by the design team. Id. These problems led 
to SME submitting numerous change orders. Id. As a result, SME incurred additional 
costs of more than $2 million, which SME submitted to Hughes-Hunt for payment. Id. 
SME argued it was entitled to recover the costs because the design team was not timely in 
responding to change order requests, and the design team's specifications often conflicted 
with the plans for the project. Id. at 672-73. These problems delayed SME on this 
project and other, unrelated projects as well. Id. at 673. 
After receiving SME's invoice for $2 million, Hughes-Hunt forwarded it to 
SLCo., which asked the design team to review it. Id. The design team recommended that 
SLCo. reject the claim. Id. Nevertheless, SLCo. settled with Hughes-Hunt, paid Hughes-
Hunt $150,000, and assigned to Hughes-Hunt "all rights, causes of action, and claims 
[SLCo.] had against the design team related to the structural steel portion of the project." 
Id. 
SLCo. 
CONTRACT 
^ 
-w 
HUGHES-
HUNT 1 
Settlement: *••., , ,..*** I 
• $150,000 payment "*" X 
• Assignment of claims 
against design team SME 
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Subsequently, Hughes-Hunt settled with SME, whereby Hughes-Hunt paid SME 
the $150,000 it received from SLCo. and "assign[ed] SME all of its direct and assigned 
rights, causes of action, and claims against the design team." Id. 
SLCo. 
CONTRACT 
HUGHES-
HUNT 
K J * • 
* 
Settlement: 
$150,000 payment 
Assignment of claims 
against design team 
SiME 
Thereafter, SME filed suit against the design team: TVS A, GSBS, and Reaveley. 
Id. The suit included the assigned claims that SLCo. and Hughes-Hunt had against the 
design team. Id. SME's two relevant causes of action were breach of contract and 
negligence against the design team. Id. 
(This space intentionally left blank.) 
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SME 
v. 
TVSA, GSBS, 
Reaveley 
Law suit asserting 
SLCo.'s and Hughes-
Hunt's assigned 
claims for, inter alia, 
breach of contract and 
negligence 
IL SME's Breach of Contract Claim Against the Design Team. 
First, SME brought a breach of contract claim against the design team for a breach 
of the SLCo.-TVSA contract. Id. at 674. The Utah Supreme Court recognized that SME 
was not & party to the SLCo,~TVSA contract and that SME was pursuing the claim 
pursuant to the assigmnent from SLCo. and Hughes-Hunt. Id. The trial court concluded 
that SME's breach of contract claim against the design team failed because an anti-
assignment clause in the SLCo.-TVSA contract prohibited the assigmnent by SLCo. to 
Hughes-Hunt, and subsequently to SME, of a breach of contract cause of action against 
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TVSA. Id. But the supreme court reversed, stating that the anti-assignment clause did 
not specifically address assignment of a cause of action seeking money damages for 
breach of contract after the contract had been fully performed. Id. at 616. 
The court further stated in dicta that if the trial court determined the anti-
assignment clause did not prohibit SME from asserting a breach of contract claim against 
the design team based on the assignment, then SME's damages would be limited to those 
damages suffered by SLCo. Id. In other words, "SME may recover only what [SLCo.] 
could recover from TVSA per the assignment." Id. The court then quoted the oft-
repeated maxim from American Jurisprudence that "the assignee is subject to any 
defenses that would have been good against the [assignor]; the assignee cannot recover 
more than the assignor could recover; and the assignee never stands in a better position 
than the assignor." Id. 
G SME's Damages Were Limited to $150,000 Because that is All SLCo. and 
Hughes-Hunt Could Have Recovered from the Design Team, Since SLCo. 
and Hughes-Hunt Both Settled for, and Suffered "Damages" of. $150.000. 
It is this last principle from American Jurisprudence that RB&G pounced upon in 
the summary judgment hearing in arguing that Enterprises could not recover from RB&G 
for the lost 14 units. But at the hearing, RB&G omitted one crucial fact: SME's damages 
were limited to those suffered by SLCo. and Hughes-Hunt (and the supreme court made 
note of it) because SLCo. and Hughes-Hunt had already settled and, in so doing, 
"suffered damages " to the tune of $150,000—no more, and no less. 
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Thus, the key distinction between SME and the instant case is this: in SME, each 
assignor (SLCo. and Hughes-Hunt), in effect, capped the damages SME could recover 
from the design team by settling and incurring "damages" in the amount of $150,000. 
Put yet another way, SME could not recover more than $150,000 from the design team 
because $150,000 is the amount SLCo. and Hughes-Hunt could have recovered from the 
design team—nothing more. 
Therefore, Enterprises does not take issue with the general proposition that an 
assignee cannot recover more than the assignor could recover. But in the instant case, by 
virtue of the privity between Enterprises and RB&G, and by virtue of the fact that there is 
no artificial cap on Development Corp.'s damages, Enterprises can recover for the lost 14 
units. Any other conclusion would sequester RB&G's liability for its conceded breach of 
the 1993 and 1995 contracts in a legal black hole, permitting no party to recover for the 
damages cause by the breaches. 
Moreover, Enterprises is not trying to recover more than Development Corp. could 
have recovered. Enterprises is trying to recover the same damages Development Corp. 
would have recovered but for the assignment to Enterprises. RB&G should not be able to 
skirt liability for its breaches based on its contrived reading of the SME case and based on 
the assignment to Enterprises. 
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court misapplied the SME case, 
thereby precluding Enterprises from recovering for RB&G's admitted breaches of the 
1993 and 1995 contracts. Alternatively, at a minimum, there exist genuine issues of 
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material facts whether Enterprises can recover for the lost 14 units based on RB&G's 
breach. Regardless, this Court must reverse the trial court's grant of partial summary 
judgment. 
IV, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IF THE COURT FINDS NO PRIVITY 
BETWEEN ENTERPRISES AND RB&G, THEN DEVELOPMENT CORP. 
REMAINS IN PRIVITY WITH RB&G, AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. 
CAN RECOVER ITS DAMAGES AS A CONSEQUENCE OF RB&G'S 
BREACHES. 
In the event the Court finds that Enterprises and RB&G are not in privity of 
contract, then by logical conclusion, Development Corp. remains in privity of contract 
with RB&G. And as a result, Development Corp. would be entitled to consequential 
damages flowing from RB&G's breaches of the 1993 and 1995 contracts. 
In any event, whether Development Corp. is in privity of contract, and thereby 
entitled to consequential damages pursuant to RB&G's breaches, is a disputed genuine 
issue of material fact necessitating reversing the trial court's grant of partial summary 
judgment. 
V. EVEN IF THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE APPLIES TO DEVELOPMENT 
CORP.'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM, RB&G HAS AN INDEPENDENT DUTY, 
AS A PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERING FIRM, TO PERFORM 
COMPETENTLY AND THOROUGHLY, THUS EXCEPTING 
DEVELOPMENT CORP.'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS FROM THE 
ECONOMIC LOSS RULE. 
Even if the Court affirms the trial court's application of the economic loss rule to 
Development Corp.'s negligence claim against RB&G, Development Corp. should 
nonetheless be able to maintain its negligence claim against RB&G. Since RB&G is a 
professional engineering firm, it has an independent duty to perform competently, 
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professional, and thoroughly, knowing others will rely, to their detriment, upon its 
analyses and conclusions. If those analyses and conclusions are incorrect due to the 
engineer's negligence, the party relying thereon will suffer dire economic and non-
economic harm—just as Development Corp. and Enterprises did in this case. 
RB&G could foresee economic harm to Development Corp. (in terms of delays, 
demolition, re-construction, and re-design) if RB&G negligently performed its geologic 
studies. This foreseeability is the very essence of tort liability, and it pushes RB&G's 
liability into tort doctrines and outside of the economic loss rule. 
A. Development Corp. Lost its Privity of Contract with RB&G when 
Development Corp. Assigned its Rights Under the 1993 and 1995 Contracts 
to Enterprises in 1996. 
Initially, Development Corp. contracted with RB&G for RB&G to perform 
geologic analyses of the Property. (R. at 392-93.) But when Development Corp. 
assigned its rights under those contracts to Enterprises in 1996, Development Corp. lost 
its privity of contract with RB&G; Enterprises gained it. (R. at 393.) It cannot be 
disputed that Development Corp. relinquished all its rights under the 1993 and 1995 
contracts to Enterprises (r. at 393), thus endowing Enterprises with those rights. 
As a result, Development Corp. was left as a third party, with no privity of 
contract with RB&G. This is a crucial point because Development Corp. now moves this 
Court to find an independent tort duty for professional engineers that exempts them from 
the economic loss rule to the extent they are not in privity of contract with the injured 
party. Thus, Development Corp. appeals the dismissal of its negligence claim against 
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RB&G. Conversely, since Enterprises is in privity of contract with RB&G, Enterprises 
does not appeal the dismissal of its negligence claims against RB&G, as Enterprises and 
RB&G were in a position to allocate risk and damages by contract (by virtue of the 
assignment). 
R The Economic Loss Rule Prevents a Recovery of Economic Damages 
Based on a Theory of Unintentional Tort, but when an Independent Duty 
Applies to the Tortfeasor, the Economic Loss Rule Does Not Preclude 
Recovery of Economic Damages. 
It is well-settled that the economic loss rule "prevents a party from claiming 
economic damages in negligence absentphysical property damage or bodily injury." 
West v. Inter-Financial Inc., 139 P3d 1059, 1061 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (citation and 
quotations omitted). 
But equally prominent is the principle that where an "independent duty exists, the 
economic loss rule does not bar a tort claim because the claim is based on a recognized 
independent duty of case and thus does not fall within the scope of the rule." Id. at 1062 
(citation and quotations omitted). 
C. It Is an Open Question Whether Other Professionals Owe Their Clients an 
Independent Tort Duty. 
In SME, although the Utah Supreme Court applied the economic loss rule to bar a 
contractor's or subcontractor's negligence claim against a design professional, the court 
left the door open to find an independent tort duty vis-a-vis other professionals: "the issue 
of whether the economic loss rule bars claims against other professionals, such as lawyers 
27 
and accountants, is not before us, and we do not decide it." SMEIndus., 28 P.3d at 682 
n.9. 
Indeed, the supreme court's application of the economic loss rule in SME was 
logical and consistent with the rational behind the economic loss rule. See, e.g., West, 
139 P.3d at 1062 (reasoning that Utah courts generally apply the economic loss rule 
where parties can avoid their economic loss "with contracts and are thus free to adjust 
their respective obligations to satisfy their mutual expectations... . [Rjelief for defeated 
economic expectations . . . was to come from the contract itself..." (citations and 
quotations omitted)). A building contractor and an architect are construction-savvy 
entities, and they would scarcely (if ever) work together on a development sans contract. 
Therefore, since a contractor and an architect can and do bargain for their rights and 
remedies, and would scarcely perform otherwise, the supreme court appropriately applied 
the economic loss rule to bar negligence claims by a contractor against a design 
professional. 
In the instant case, however, Development Corp. relied upon RB&G to accurately 
and competently perform its analyses, the failure of which led to enormous financial loss 
for Development Corp. Since Development Corp. lost its privity with RB&G pursuant to 
the 1996 assignment, Development Corp. should now be able to assert its negligence 
claim against RB&G based on RB&G's esoteric knowledge and experience, the 
information asymmetry between Development Corp. and RB&G, and Development 
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Corp.'s reliance upon RB&G for a professional, complete, accurate analysis of the 
Property. 
D. This Court Can Properly Address Common Law Issues and Make Policy 
Judgments "To Get the Law Right/' As Evidenced By the Utah Supreme 
Court in Yazd v. Woodside Homes, 
Admittedly, "courts [typically] cede authority over matters of policy to the 
political branches of the government." Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 143 P. 3d 283, 
287 (Utah 2006). But when policy considerations "bear on a subject lodged firmly within 
the court's sphere, like the common law, it is entirely appropriate for the court to make 
policy judgments necessary to get the law right." Id, 
The question whether professional engineers owe an independent tort duty to their 
clients is squarely within this Court's sphere, precisely as whether builder-contractors 
owed an independent duty to their customers was within the supreme court's sphere in 
Yazd, Thus, this Court can appropriately and timely speak to this issue. 
R. Professional Engineers have an Independent Duty Based on a "Special 
Relationship" with their Clients Stemming from Information Asymmetry, 
Engineers' Esoteric Knowledge and Expertise, and their Clients' Reliance 
Thereon. 
Legal duty is a product "of policy judgments applied to relationships." Yazd, 143 
P.3d at 286; see also Webb v. University of Utah, 125 P.3d 906, 909 (Utah 2005) ("Duty 
arises out of the relationship between the parties and imposes a legal obligation on one 
party for the benefit of the other party."). Whether one party owes another party a legal 
duty is a function of "[a]ge, knowledge, influence, bargaining power, sophistication, and 
cognitive ability," among other factors. Yazd, 143 P.3d at 286. When there is a disparity 
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in "one or more of these circumstances," the balance in the parties' relationship becomes 
distorted "to the degree that one party is exposed to unreasonable risk/' justifying "the 
law['s] intervene[tion] by creating a duty on the advantaged party to conduct itself in a 
manner that does not reward exploitation of its advantage" Id. (emphasis added). 
But simply because one party possesses "important, even vital" information does 
not mean that party has a legal duty to another absent some relationship between the 
parties. Id. at 287. An example of this is the "special relationship" doctrine in tort law. 
Id. "A person has no legal duty to protect another person from the conduct of a stranger 
unless the person upon whom a duty is sought to be imposed has a 'special relationship' 
with either the stranger or the potential victim." Id.; see also Gilger v. Hernandez, 997 
P.2d 305, 310 (Utah 2000) ("a person has no affirmative duty . . . to protect another from 
harm" unless the person "upon whom a duty is sought to be imposed" has a special 
relationship with either the person causing the harm or the injured person). Thus, in the 
context of ordinary negligence actions, "a special relationship is what is required to give 
rise to a duty to a c t . . . . " Webb, 125 P.3d at 910. 
The essence of a "special relationship" is "dependence by one party upon the other 
. . . . " Webb, 125 P.3d at 909. The Utah Supreme Court, quoting Black's Law 
Dictionary, also noted that a "special relationship" is "[a] nonfiduciary relationship 
having an element of trust, arising especially] when one person trusts another to exercise 
a reasonable degree of care . . . ." Webb, 125 P.3d at 909-10 (quoting Black's Law 
Dictionary 1405 (7th ed. 1999) (first alteration in original)). 
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Utah courts have found that typically, although not always, parties subject to a 
"special relationship" do not allocate their risk with contracts. West, 139 P.3d at 1064. 
In one particular case, the Utah Supreme Court found a "special relationship" between an 
accountant and a third party despite the lack of contractual privity, thereby subjecting the 
accountant to economic damage in spite of the economic loss rule. Milliner v. Elmer Fox 
& Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974). The supreme court went on to hold that a third party 
could maintain a negligence action against an accountant where the third party relied on 
the accountant's report and where the accountant knew that the party would rely on the 
report for a particular purpose. Id. at 808. Speaking to privity between the parties, the 
court clarified that "lack of privity is not a defense where an accountant... is aware of 
the fact that his work will be relied on by a party or parties . . . . " Id. 
Milliner is particularly instructive in the instant case because the accountant knew 
the party would rely upon his report, just as in our case, RB&G knew Development Corp. 
and/or Enterprises would rely upon RB&G's two reports. And privity or not (although 
Development Corp. does not ask this Court to permit tort recovery when an engineer is in 
privity with the injured party), the Utah Supreme Court suggests that where a 
professional knows that a party—even a third party, in Milliner's case—will rely upon 
the professional's report for a particular purpose, that party can assert a negligence claim 
against the professional because a "special relationship" exists. 
Utah courts have found a "special relationship" between other parties as well. For 
example, as mentioned above, there is a "special relationship" between builder-
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developers and their customers, even though those parties typically allocate their risk by 
contract. Yazd, 143 P.3d at 287. Additionally, Utah courts found a "special relationship" 
between surveyor and third parties, despite lack of privity of contract. Price-Orem 
Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah 1986).2 
And in Hermansen v. Tasulis, the Utah Supreme Court found a special relationship 
between real estate brokers and their clients. 48 P.3d 235, 241 (Utah 2002). In finding 
the "special relationship" in Hermansen, the court reasoned that a real estate agent owes a 
duty, independent of any express or implied contract, "to be honest, ethical, and 
competent" in his or her relationship with the client. Id. Real estate professionals cannot, 
the court held, breach their duty to be competent, and not be liable for their actions. Id. 
Similarly, engineering professionals occupy a comparable status in their industry. 
Companies and individuals wholly rely upon engineering professionals to provide 
accurate, complete, competent advice and reports. To the extent engineering 
professionals fail that standard, they must be held accountable for the consequences. 
Make no mistake: there is a real and present danger, even present in this case, that an 
engineering professional, like RB&G, could negligently performs its duty by, for 
example, failing to identify faults, leading to considerable damage in the form of 
substantial economic and non-economic losses. Yet the engineering professional would 
2
 Coincidentally, RB&G was a defendant in the Price-Orem case as well (there 
styled as "Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc."), wherein RB&G also argued that based on a 
lack of contractual privity, it could not be liable for its negligence. Especially in light of 
that case, RB&G should be well aware of its duties and obligations to those who rely 
upon its analyses and reports. 
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be liability-proof; the damaged party could not recover any money damages in spite of 
the engineer's negligence and breach. The instant case is evidence of this very scenario. 
One unique feature of professional engineers that gives rise to an independent 
duty—especially prominent in the instant case—is the foreseeability they have with 
respect to damages should they negligently perform their duties. In other words, 
engineers can foresee that their clients will suffer Herculean financial harm if the 
engineers' tests, analyses, and reports are flawed due to negligence on the engineers' part. 
As engineers are often involved at the beginning of a development, as RB&G was here, 
the engineers know their clients rely upon them for professional, competent advice with 
respect to development design and construction. If the engineers are negligent, they 
know their clients will suffer the financial consequences. 
Therefore, professional engineers owe their clients an independent duty to perform 
competently, thoroughly, and professionally. Anything less and engineers can escape 
liability, as RB&G has nearly done in this case. 
R The Economic Loss Rule, While Valuable, Is Limited in its Application, 
Lest the Rule Swallow Tort Law Entirely. 
As Justice Bradley of the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently noted, the economic 
loss rule is "'the ever-expanding, all-consuming alien life form portrayed in the 1958 B-
movie classic The Blob'" and is "'a swelling globule on the legal landscape . . . . ' " 1325 
N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd., 716 N.W.2d 822, 841 (Wis. 2006) (Bradley, J. 
dissenting) (quoting Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 180 (Wis. 2005)). 
Although useful in limited contexts, this Court should take appropriate steps to limit its 
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application so as to prevent the rule from swallowing legitimate causes of action and 
recovery in tort. 
The Florida Supreme Court sagely addressed the limited applicability and use of 
the economic loss rule, as it is a potent doctrine that effectively bars otherwise valid 
causes of action. 
In Moransais v. Heathman, the Florida Supreme Court recognized that although 
"the economic loss rule may have some genuine, but limited value in . . . damages law, 
we never intended to bar well-established common law causes of action, such as those for 
neglect in providing professional services " 744 So. 2d 973, 983 (Fla. 1999) (emphasis 
added). Rather, as the court noted, the rule was originally intended to limit causes of 
action in the product liability context, thus, the rule's application "should generally be 
limited to those contexts or situations where the policy considerations are substantially 
identical to those underlying the product liability-type analysis," id., such as the builder-
developer exception the Utah Supreme Court adopted in Yazd. 
Speaking more directly to negligence causes of action against "professionals," the 
court went on to clarify that since such actions "often involve purely economic loss 
without any accompanying personal injury or property damage, extending the economic 
loss rule to these cases would effectively extinguish such causes of action." Id.; see also 
Paul J. Schwiep, The Economic Loss Rule Outbreak: The Monster That Ate Commercial 
Torts, Fla. B.J. 34, 40 (Nov. 1995) ("[I]f the doctrine were genuinely applied to bar all 
tort claims for economic losses without accompanying personal injury or property 
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damage, the rule would wreak havoc on the common law of torts."); Blanche M. 
Manning, Legal Malpractice: Is it Tort or Contract?, 21 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 741, 742 
(1990) ("Because attorney malpractice rarely results in personal injury or property 
damage, the damages plaintiffs seek most often in malpractice claims against attorneys 
are for economic or pecuniary losses allegedly caused by the attorney's failure to exercise 
adequate care."). Surely this cannot be what Utah courts have in mind for the economic 
loss rule in Utah. 
The Florida Supreme Court has the right analysis. Since professionals' negligence 
often results only in economic loss without accompanying personal injury or property 
damage, extending the economic loss rule to negligence actions against professional 
engineers would extinguish recovery for professional engineers' negligence. This Court 
should refuse to allow professional engineers that engage in negligence from answering 
for their negligence. 
G. Other Jurisdictions Have Recognized the Limits of the Economic Loss Rule 
By Applying the "Special Relationship" Exception to Professional 
Engineers like RB&G, as Well as Other Professionals. 
Nineteen other jurisdictions have persuasively exempted professionals— 
commonly engineers, architects, and design professionals—from the protection of the 
economic loss rule based on the professionals' foreseeability of the damages and on the 
injured party's reliance on the professional's expertise and knowledge, about which the 
professional is aware. These jurisdictions include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
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Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, 
and Washington.3 
3
 See, e.g., Owen v. Dodd, 431 F. Supp. 1239 (N.D. Miss. 1977) (contractor may 
recover against architect); Waldor Pump & Equip. Co. v. Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Assoc., 
Inc., 386 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (subcontractor may recover against 
engineer); Detweiler Bros., Inc. v. John Graham & Co., All F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Wash. 
1976) (subcontractor may recover against architect); United States ex rel Los Angeles 
Testing Laboratory v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (contractor 
may recover against architect); A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. graham, 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973) 
(contractor may recover against architect or engineer); Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc. v. 
Providence Hosp., 454 So. 2d 496 (Ala. 1984) (subcontractor may recover against 
architect); Donnelly Const. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292 (Ariz. 1984) 
(architect liable on negligence theory to contractor for increased cost of construction due 
to error in plans and specifications); Carroll-Boone Water Dist. v. M &P Equip. Co., 661 
S.W.2d 345 (Ark. 1983) (contractor may recover against engineer); Wolther v. 
Schaarschrnidt, 738 P.2d25 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (purchaser of home may recover 
against engineer); Guardian Const, v. Tetra Tech Richardson, Inc., 583 A.2d 1378 (Del. 
Super. 1990) (lack of contractual privity between design engineer and general contractor 
was not fatal to negligence and negligence misrepresentation claims against design 
engineer, notwithstanding fact that contractor and subcontractor were seeking purely 
economic damages); Normoyle-Berg & Assoc, Inc. v. Village of Deer Creek, 350 N.E.2d 
559 (111. Ct. App. 1976) (contractor may recover against engineer); Gurtler, Hebert & 
Co., Inc. v. WeylandMachine Shop, Inc., 405 So. 2d 660 (La. Ct. App. 1981) 
(subcontractor may assert third-party claim against architect); Craig v. Everett M. Brooks 
Co., 222 N.E.2d 752 (Mass. 1967) (contractor may recover against engineer); Nat 7 Sand, 
Inc. v. Nagel Constr., Inc., 451 N.W.2d 618 (Mich. 1990) (subcontractor may maintain 
action against engineers); Bacco Const. Co. v. American Colloid Co., 384 N.W.2d 427 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (contractor may recover against engineer); Magnolia Constr. Co. 
v. Mississippi Gulf South Engrs, Inc., 518 S. 2d 1194 (Miss. 1988) (architect owes duty 
to contractor); Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. John C Morris Assoc, 418 A.2d 1290 (N.J. 
Super. 1980), affd, 489 A.2d 1233 (NJ. Super. 1985) (contractor may recover against 
design professional); Ossining Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Anderson LaRocca Anderson, 
539 N.E.2d 91 (N.Y. 1989) (owner may recover against consulting engineer); Shoffner 
Indust, Inc. v. W.B. Lloyd Const. Co., 257 S.E.2d 50 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (contractor 
may recover against architect); Davidson & Jones, Inc. v. New Hanover County, 255 
S.E.2d 580 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (architect, in absence of privity of contract, may be sued 
by general contractor or subcontractor for economic loss foreseeably resulting from 
architect's breach of duty of due care in performance of contract with owner); Forte 
Bros, Inc. v. Natl Amusement, Inc., 525 A.2d 1301 (R.I. 1987) (contractor may recover 
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In fact, since the 1990s, courts are increasingly limiting the application of the 
economic loss rule against professionals, frequently engineers, for professional 
negligence. For example: 
• In Lyndon Prop. Ins. Co. v. Duke Levy & Assoc, LLC, 475 F3d 268 (5th Cir. 
2007), the Fifth Circuit, applying Mississippi law, held that an engineer could be 
held liable in negligence in spite of a governing contract between the parties. The 
court declined to apply the economic loss rule. 
• In Farmers Alliance Mutual Ins. Co. v. Nay lor, 452 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. N.M. 
2006), the U.S. District Court in New Mexico held that the economic loss rule 
does not bar tort claims arising from an independent duty of care, specifically, a 
negligence claim for professional negligence. That court relied in part upon the 
Utah Supreme Court's reasoning in Hermansen, that where an independent duty 
exists, the economic loss rule does not fall within the scope of the rule. Id. at 
1174. 
• In Maine Rubber Int 7 v. Envtl. Mgmt. Group, Inc. ,216 F.R.D. 222 (D. Me. 2003), 
the U.S. District Court in Maine held that a party could maintain a negligence 
claim for professional malpractice independent of a contract. The court declined 
to apply the economic loss rule. 
• In Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 591 (W. Va. 2000), the Supreme Court of 
West Virginia, although applying the economic loss rule, went on to state that a 
against architect); Associated Architects & Eng'rs, Inc. v. Lubbock Glass & Mirror Co., 
422 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (subcontractor may recover against architect). 
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tortfeasor may be held liable "where a special and narrowly defined relationship 
can be established between the tortfeasor and the plaintiff who was deprived of an 
economic benefit.. ." (emphasis added). Such cases would involve the 
tortfeasor's foreseeability that economic losses would result from the tortfeasor's 
negligence. Id. 
• InMoransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1999), the Florida Supreme Court 
held that a party could maintain a negligence claim against engineers who failed to 
detect and disclose certain defects in the property. The court declined to apply the 
economic loss rule. 
• In Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co, v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 
463 S.E.2d 85 (S.C. 1995), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a 
contractor could maintain suit in tort for purely economic losses because the 
engineer owed the contractor a duty not to negligently design or negligently 
supervise the project. The court declined to apply the economic loss rule. 
• In John Martin Co., Inc. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. 1991), the 
Tennessee Supreme Court held that a subcontractor, despite lack of privity, could 
make a claim against the construction manager based upon negligence. The court 
declined to apply the economic loss rule. 
• In City of Cairo v. Hightower Consulting Eng 'rs, Inc., 629 S.E.2d 519 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2006), the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the economic loss rule did not 
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bar an injured party from recovering economic damages from an engineering firm 
for negligence. 
• In Best Friends Pet Care, Inc. v. Design Learned, Inc., No. X06CV000169755S, 
2003 WL 22962147, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2003), the Superior Court of 
Connecticut held that the economic loss rule did not bar a negligence claim against 
an engineering firm. 
• In Nestlenook, Inc. v. Atlantic Design Eng'rs, No CA 01-0154A, 2003 WL 
22670881, at *2 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Oct. 22, 2003), the Superior Court of 
Massachusetts held that a negligence claim against an engineer was viable because 
the engineer "knew [the injured party] would be relying on [the engineer's 
knowledge and expertise in staking property]." The court declined to apply the 
economic loss rule. 
As the Court can see, jurisdictions around the country are increasingly limiting the 
application of the economic loss rule to professionals, especially engineers, because 
plaintiffs so wholly rely upon engineers' expertise and knowledge in planning and 
developing property, whether a single home or an enormous planned community. 
Engineers' knowledge, expertise, and information asymmetry give rise to this 
independent duty. Utah should follow its sister jurisdictions and adopt this duty. 
"A court's conclusion that duty does or does not exist is 'an expression of the sum 
total of those consideration of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is [or is 
not] entitled to protection.'" Webb, 125 P.3d at 909 (quoting Univ. of Denver v. 
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Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, 57 (Colo. 1987)). If this Court concluded professional contractors 
have no independent duty to their clients, the Court is saying Development Corp. is not 
entitled to protection from RB&G's negligence. The Court is saying Development Corp. 
cannot recover for RB&G's professional failures. The Court is shifting the liability for 
RB&G's negligence—not on the tortfeasor, but on the injured party. 
The Court should find professional engineers have an independent duty to their 
clients to perform with the skill, precision, and knowledge their clients expect and the law 
demands. 
VL ULTIMATELY, RB&G MUST BE HELD LIABLE TO SOMEONE FOR 
ITS BREACHES OF THE 1993 AND 1995 CONTRACTS. THUS, IF THE 
COURT FINDS NO PRIVITY, AND IT THE COURT APPLIES THE 
ECONOMIC LOSS RULE WHILE REFUSING TO FIND AN 
INDEPENDENT DUTY, RB&G'S LIABILITY GETS SWALLOWED BY A 
LEGAL BLACK HOLE, AND RB&G NEVER ANSWERS FOR THE 
DAMAGE IT CAUSED THROUGH ITS BREACHES. EQUITY 
DEMANDS OTHERWISE. 
Based on principles of equity, the Court should not allow RB&G to escape 
liability for its negligence and admitted breaches. It must be liable for the consequences 
of its actions. 
Utah courts, "in light of [their] plenary powers in administering law and equity, 
can make such orders as are necessary and expedient in order to do justice between the 
parties as the particular circumstances warrant." Lanier v. Pyne, 508 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 
1973). 
In most cases before this Court, "fairness" and "equity" are loose concepts, 
ambiguous because they rarely apply to dispositively affect the disposition of a case. 
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Indeed, if appellants argued, and the Court decided, based on usually subjective notions 
of equity and fairness, the law would lose its predictability. 
But occasionally, a case comes along where the principles of equity are truly, 
undeniably stacked in one party's favor. This is such a case. 
If the Court (1) does not find Enterprises in privity with RB&G, and (2) applies 
the economic loss rule to preclude Development Corp.'s negligence claim, and (3) fails to 
adopt an independent duty for professional engineers, RB&G is liability proof. No party 
can recover for RB&G's conceded breached which caused more than $1 million in 
damages. Development Corp. and Enterprises must absorb that entire liability. This 
contravenes all the principles of the law and equity. 
The three goals of tort law are deterrence, retribution, and compensation. 
Permitting RB&G to escape liability for its breaches contravenes all three goals. It does 
not deter others from being negligent; it does not punish RB&G for its negligence; it does 
not reimburse or compensate Development Corp. and Enterprises for their losses. 
Based on the Court's inherent, broad powers of equity and fairness, the Court 
should preclude RB&G from escaping liability by allowing Development Corp. to 
recover under its negligence claim and by allowing Enterprises to assert its breach of 
contract claim to recover for the lost 14 units. 
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CONCLUSION 
Therefore, in light of the foregoing, this Court should reverse the trial court's grant 
of partial summary judgment in RB&G's favor and remand this case back to the trial 
court. 
th RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4m day of May 2007. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
StepheVQuesenber 
Charles L. Perschon 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 1 
ADDENDUM 1 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
2!,r tM*^ D e P t J t v 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUNRIDGE DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION, etal..., 
vs. 
p-p\Rrfi- vhjn-Thrcvv^-in- fMr1 
Plaintiffs, 
RULING RE: DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case # 030400328 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Defendant. 
Division 5 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant' s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
The Court, having reviewed the file and being fully advised in the premises, hereby issues the 
following: 
Ruling 
Defendant filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with the Court on March 9, 
2005, asserting that SDC's and SEL's negligence claims are barred as a matter of law by Utah's 
economic loss rule. Defendant contends that only SDC's claim for breach of contract remains. 
Plaintiffs assert that most of its damages are recoverable or that the amount of damages are at 
least in dispute and that Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c) states that summary judgment "shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving part}' is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The Utah Supreme Court, in National 
S?K 
American Life Insurance Company v. Bayou Country Club, Inc., 403 P.2d 26 (Utah 1965), stated 
that summary judgment rules "should be liberally interpreted to effectuate their purpose, to effect 
the prompt administration of justice, and to expedite litigation by avoiding needless trials where 
no triable issue of fact is disclosed." Id, at 29 (citations omitted). The purpose of summary 
judgment is to "provide a means of searching out the undisputed facts" to find if the matter can 
McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266,1267-68 (Utah 1976). 
The Court first finds that there are no material issues of fact and that the issues before 
the Court can be resolved as a matter of law. 
The Court is unpersuaded that SDC and SEL can maintain their independent negligence 
claims. The Court notes that "the economic loss rule holds that 'economic losses are not 
recoverable in negligence absent physical damage or bodily injury.'" SME Industries, Inc. V. 
Thompson, Ventuleet, Stainback and Associates, Inc., 2001 UT 54, \ 35, 28 P.3d 669. The 
Court, therefore, for the reasons stated in Defendant's memoranda, finds that SDC's and SEL's 
negligence claims are barred by the economic loss rule. 
The next issue before the Court is whether the economic loss rule limits Plaintiffs' 
damages. Defendant asserts that SME Industries is controlling and directly on point in this 
matter and that SEL must stand in the shoes of SDC and can only recover damages that SDC is 
entitled to. Plaintiffs asserts that SEL is in privity with Defendant and that SEL may seek its own 
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damages from Defendant. Seemingly, under general theories of contract law, one might suggest 
that SEL may recover its damages which were incurred due to Defendant's breach of contract 
with SDC. However, the Court notes SME Industries, which was determined in hindsight and is 
controlling, stands for the rule that an assignee stands in the shoes of an assignor and that the 
assignee never stands in a better position than the assignor. SME Industries, 28 P.3d at 676. 
TTnder ?\«r h~dH"trieL S^L TLE:T' O^"' ^ursur SDC'r clair^ and r*e-iedier ^^ani^ D f^pp.Hs-p* 
In this case, SDC and SEL have characterized their damages respectively. Under SME 
Industries, SEL's damages are limited by that characterization. Accordingly, SEL only has a 
claim for damages incurred by SDC1. 
In summary, the Court grants Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. 
Counsel for Defendant is instructed to prepare an order consistent with this Ruling. 
1The Court notes that SEL's damages do not appear to be 
consequential damages. The facts do not illustrate that SEL 
bought the property at an increased price based on unit value. . 
There was no showing that SEL suffered any loss of actual value 
regarding the entire property due to the loss of the 14 units as 
a result of Defendant's alleged breach. Moreover, Plaintiffs 
generalized the development process and have not distinguished 
when Plaintiffs were on notice of Defendant's breach. As a 
consequence, many of Plaintiffs' alleged damages are not 
consequential damages. 
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Dated this ;/£>£ day of August, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
>'jfifa or- ,***£^ 
£< 
JDGE FRED D. HOWARTi'i~ f <£tff§&&i?d I I JU   .flOWARDPU, i. « * * * „ . , 
District Court Juflge ^7'>\ *^€§^W$-£~/$ 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that true copies of the foregoing Ruling were delivered on the ^ day of 
August, 2005 to the following in the manner indicated, to wit: 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs: 
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Craig C. Coburn 
Lincoln Harris 
RICHARD, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
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PO Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465 
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Page 5 of 5 
ADDENDUM 2 
ADDENDUM 2 
2003 WL 22962147 Page 1 of 1 
Not Reported in A.2d, 2003 WL 22962147 (Conn.Super.), 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 99 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Superior Court of Connecticut, 
Judicial District of Waterbury. 
BEST FRIENDS PET CARE, INC. 
v. 
DESIGN LEARNED, INC. et al. 
No. X06CV000169755S. 
Dec. 3, 2003. 
Blackburn Stuart G Law Offices, Windsor Locks, for Best Friends Pet Care Inc. 
Updike Kelly & Spellacy, Hartford, for Design Learned Inc. 
Leboeuf Lamb Greene & Macrae, Hartford, for American Standard Companies Inc. 
JON M. ALANDER, Judge. 
* 1 In this action, the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for the loss of use of its building damaged by 
fire as a result of the alleged negligence of the defendant Design Learned, Inc. ("Design Learned"), an 
engineering firm. The plaintiff claims that, during construction of the building, Design Learned 
negligently failed to specify non-combustible flooring or a heat shield near burner units, resulting in a 
fire. While the plaintiff had a contract with the construction manager of the project, it lacked a 
contract with Design Learned. Design Learned has filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting 
that the plaintiffs claim is barred by the economic loss doctrine. 
The appellate courts of this state have not recognized the economic loss rule advocated by Design 
Learned, that, in the absence of privity of contract or in the absence of injury to person or property, 
the plaintiff may not recover in tort for economic losses. The decision in Flagg[EnergyiD^eveloBment 
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 244 Conn. 126, 155 (1998), is inapposite as it addresses the remedies 
available under the Uniform Commercial Code for injuries resulting from the sale of an allegedly 
defective product. 
In the context of this case, given the allegations of the complaint, the applicable law remains that a 
tortfeasor is liable for negligently causing harm that was foreseeable. CoburRv, Lenoxjjto^^ 
186 Conn. 370 (1982). Design Learned's knowledge that the plaintiff would rely on its work eliminates 
any concern that the lack of an economic loss rule of the sort propounded by the defendant may 
resuIt i n unIimited IiabiIity. See CrajgjL E y e ^ . 
In short, I find persuasive the well reasoned opinions in RCD-Hudson v. T.A.T. Mason Enterprises, 
Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-00-598478-S, (Jan. 17, 2001) (Beach, J.) 
(29 Conn. L. Rptr. 261), and Insurance Company of North America v. Town of Manchester, 17 
F.Supp.2d 81 (D.Conn. 1998), rejecting the application of a blanket prohibition on the recovery of 
economic losses resulting from negligent conduct in the absence of privity of contract. Accordingly, 
Design Learned's motion for summary judgment is hereby denied. 
Conn.Super.,2003. 
Best Friends Pet Care, Inc. v. Design Learned, Inc. 
Not Reported in A.2d, 2003 WL 22962147 (Conn.Super.), 36 Conn. L Rptr. 99 
END OF DOCUMENT 
(C) 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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Not Reported in N.E.2d, 17 Mass.LRptr. 25, 2003 WL 22670881 (Mass.Super.) 
Superior Court of Massachusetts. 
NESTLENOOK, INC., 
v. 
ATLANTIC DESIGN ENGINEERS. 
No. CA 01-0154A. 
Oct. 22, 2003. 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CHARLES]. HELY, Justice. 
A. Introduction 
* 1 The defendant Atlantic Design Engineers supplied engineering services to the Town of 
Middleborough and served part-time as the town engineer. Atlantic was assigned by the 
Middlebourough Planning Board to review the plaintiff Nestlenook's application to for approval of a 
subdivision proposed by Nestlenook. Nestlenook claims that Atlantic performed the engineering 
services negligently. Specifically, Nestlenook claims that Atlantic's comment letter to the town 
negligently required Nestlenook to design and construct a retention pond as part of the drainage 
system for the subdivision. Nestlenook contends that its construction of the retention pond in 
compliance with Atlantic's comment letter caused it economic losses and property damage. 
Nestlenook alleges claims for negligence, breach of contract, breach of implied warranties of 
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and violation of G.L. c. 93A. Only the negligence 
claim can survive summary judgment. 
B. Public Employee Immunity 
Atlantic is not entitled to summary judgment under the public employee immunity in G.L. c. 258, § 2. 
The "public employee" definition in G.L. c. 258, § 1, includes part-time as well as full-time officers and 
employees. Atlantic's part-time status with the town does not preclude public employee immunity. 
The "public employee" definition in Section 1, must also be read in conjunction with the "public 
employer" definition in the same section. To be a public employee the person must be an officer or 
employee "of any public employer." The "public employer" definition includes towns and other 
government entities if the employer "exercises direction and control" over the public employee. 
Consistently with these interlocking definitions, the case law has relied on the principal's right to 
exercise direction and control as a primary consideration in determining whether a particular 
defendant is a public employee for Chapter 258 immunity purposes. Kelley v. Rossi, 395 Mass. 659, 
661-64 (1985); Smith v. Steinberg, 395 Mass. 666, 669 (1985); 
Although Atlantic may have held the title of town engineer as a single, full-time employee might in 
other towns, the evidence is that Atlantic was an independent contractor. The evidence supports 
Nestlenook's argument that Atlantic was not subject to the right of direction and control by the town 
in how it performed its engineering services. Atlantic no doubt was subject to some control by the 
town in that the town assigned it projects and identified the scope of each particular assignment. The 
manner of carrying out these assignments was still a matter of Atlantic's independent professional 
engineering judgment. The town was not Atlantic's only engineering client, and this is also a relevant 
factor. Atlantic is a private corporation, and it acts through a group of human agents rather than one 
person. These factors also lessen the town's right to exercise direction and control over how Atlantic 
performed its professional services. 
httn.W/web2.westlawxom/result/docum 5/3/2007 
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*2 Suffice it to say that Atlantic has not demonstrated that it was not an independent contractor, and 
it has not shown that the town retained the right to control the manner of Atlantic's performance of 
its professional services. See Kelley v Rossi, supra; Smith v. Steinberg, supra; Williams v. Hartman, 
413 Mass. 398f 400-01 (1997); Hopper v. Callahan, 408 Mass. 621, 634 (1990); Thornton v. 
CommQnw^ 28 Mass.,^ 514 (1990); compare McNamara y. Honeyman^ 43, 
48 (1989); Williams v. Bresnahan. 27 Mass.App.Ct. 191 (1989); Florio v. Kennedy, 18 Mass.App.Ct. 
917 (1984). 
C. Economic Loss Rule 
Atlantic is not entitled to summary judgment under the economic loss rule. Nestlenook has presented 
evidence that it sustained physical damage to its property, rather than just economic loss, allegedly 
caused by negligence of Atlantic. Priority Finishing Corp, v. LAL Construction Corp., 40 Mass.App.Ct. 
719, 721 (1996). 
D. Negligence and Duty 
Atlantic argues that it performed engineering services only to the town Planning Board and that it 
cannot be liable in negligence to Nestlenook because it owed no legal duty to Nestlenook. Atlantic 
relies on the lender's attorney malpractice case of Page v. Frazier, 388 Mass. 55 (1982). 
As Nestlenook correctly points out, however, the negligence claim against Atlantic in this case is much 
more analogous to the negligence claim against the engineer in Craig v. Everett M. Brooks Co., 351 
Mass. 497, 500-01 (1967). In Craig, the court reversed the directed verdict for the defendant 
engineer on a negligence claim despite the lack of a contractual relationship between the plaintiff 
contractor and the engineer. The defendant engineer in Craig knew the identity of the plaintiff 
contractor and knew that the contractor would be relying on the locations of the stakes that the 
defendant engineer put in for the landowner. Id. Under the authority of Craig, summary judgment 
must be denied on the negligence claim. 
E. Contract 
There is an absence of evidence from which a fair-minded jury could conclude that Nestlenook had a 
contract with Atlantic. Atlantic was selected by the town to perform engineering services for the town. 
It is true that Nestlenook reimbursed the town for Atlantic's engineering services. If Nestlenook 
wanted to proceed with the subdivision application, it had no choice. Nestlenook was required to pay 
this reimbursement to the town by the Planning Board's procedures. 
Nestlenook did not pay Atlantic for services provided to Nestlenook. Nestlenook instead was required 
to pay to the town the town's costs for having Atlantic perform engineering services for the town. The 
services Atlantic provided for the town were to determine for the town whether Nestlenook's plans 
satisfied the town's subdivision regulations and to make comments on what type of modifications 
would be required for compliance. Atlantic was hired to protect the town, not Nestlenook. Atlantic's 
only contract in this case was with the town. Atlantic is entitled to summary judgment on the contract 
claim. 
F. Implied Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness for a Particular Purpose 
*3 If the defendant had been a supplier of a product or other "goods" to the plaintiff, there would be 
an implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, provided that the plaintiff 
was a person whom the defendant might reasonably have expected to use the goods. G.L. c. 106, 55 
2-314, 2-315, 2-318. Lack of privity between the user of the goods and the supplier would not be a 
defense to a breach of warranty claim in such circumstances. G.L. c. 106, § 2-318. 
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In this case Atlantic supplied no "goods" to Nestlenook. G.L c. 106, 5 2-105 (definition of "goods"); 
Garaay, Kusan, Inc, 39 MasSvApp,Ct 322,32111995} ("Even assuming in the plaintiff's favor that 
the [floor hockey] game-the concept and instructions-was the "product" which was sold ..., there is 
no legal support for imposing liability on such a "product" where the seller does not provide a tangible 
item as well as instructions"). Because there was no contract with Nestlenook and no supplying of 
goods by Atlantic to Nestlenook, there was no implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a 
particular purpose. Atlantic is entitled to summary judgment on these implied warranty claims. 
G. Chapter 93A and Trade or Commerce 
On the Chapter 93A claim, Atlantic is entitled to summary judgment for two reasons. The summary 
judgment evidence demonstrates that Atlantic's connection with Nestlenook in this case was strictly in 
the context of Atlantic providing engineering services to the town. Nestlenook alleges that it relied on 
Atlantic's recommended changes to the drainage plans, but that reliance was only in the context of 
Nestlenook's application to the town Planning Board for subdivision approval. Atlantic's dealings with 
Nestlenook were solely as an agent for the town Planning Board in the course of the Planning Board 
performing its statutory duties under the Subdivision Control Law, G,L c^l / ._J_MK-^lGG.. 
Atlantic's performance of engineering services for the town Planning Board involved no business 
context relationship between Atlantic and Nestlenook. Under the Chapter 93A case law involving 
governmental defendants, Atlantic was therefore not engaged in trade or commerce with Nestlenook 
when it reviewed Nestlenook's plans for the Planning Board in fulfilment of the Planning Board's 
statutory duties. Boston Housing Authority v. Howard, All Mass. 537 (1998.).; Ls^y^teJIace 
Associates v. Boston Redevelopment Authority, 427 Mass. 509, 534 (1998); Pea body N.E., Inc. v. 
Marshfield, 426 Mass. 436, 439-40 (1998); Poznik v. Medical Professional Insurance Association, 417 
Mass...48^ 52...(JL994); M . S e a ^ Z,.....C.Offl 
416 Mass. 269^ 271 (1993); Morton v. Hanover, 43 Mass.App.Ct. 197, 206 (1997); Bretton v. State 
Lottery Commission, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 736 (1996). 
The second reason why Atlantic has no Chapter 93A liability is that there is an absence of evidence in 
the summary judgment materials that Atlantic engaged in any unfair or deceptive conduct, even 
assuming that there was negligence by Atlantic in reviewing and commenting on Nestlenook's plans. 
H. Order 
*4 Summary judgment will enter for the defendant dismissing all claims in the plaintiffs complaint 
except Count I alleging negligence. 
Mass.Super.,2003. 
Nestlenook, Inc. v. Atlantic Design Engineers 
Not Reported in N.E.2d, 17 Mass.LRptr. 25, 2003 WL 22670881 (Mass.Super.) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
(C) 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Viffnc./Ax/Ph? wpstlaw.com/resuliydocum^^ 5/3/2007 
ADDENDUM 4 
ADDENDUM 4 
216F.R.D.222 Page 1 of 5 
216 F.R.D. 222 
Motions, Pleadings and Filings 
United States District Court, 
D. Maine. 
MAINE RUBBER INTERNATIONAL, Plaintiff 
v. 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC., Defendant 
No. 02-226-P-H. 
July 1, 2003. 
In action for breach of contract, negligence and negligent misrepresentation, plaintiff moved for leave 
to amend complaint to add negligence claim against two individual defendants, who were employees 
of corporate defendant. The District Court, David M. Cohen, United States Magistrate Judge, held that 
plaintiff was entitled to leave to amend complaint to add claim against two individual defendants. 
Motion granted. 
West Headnotes 
[1] KeyCite Notes 
0 3 7 9 Torts 
Q-379I In General 
o^379k!16 Injury or Damage from Act 
^^17.9^11.8 k. Economic Loss Doctrine. MosLQltedLCases 
(Formerly 379k5) 
Under Maine law, the economic loss rule prohibits the recovery of damages for purely economic losses 
in tort actions. 
[2] KeyCite Notes... 
C--1ZQA Federal Civil Procedure 
<^1ZPAVII Pleadings and Motions 
<^iZPAyn(E) Amendments 
<sffl70Ak851 k. Form and Sufficiency of Amendment. Most Cited Cases 
A motion for leave to amend a complaint may be denied if the proposed amendment would be futile. 
Fed, Rules. Civ, PrpcJRule.lSCaX.ZMJ^.^A. 
IK, 
[31 KeyCite Notes 
4>170A Federal Civil Procedure 
<^170AVII Pleadings and Motions 
>*>170AVII(E) Amendments 
.- 170Ak851 k. Form and Sufficiency of Amendment. Most Cited Cases 
"Futility" of an amendment, as would warrant denial of motion for leave to amend complaint, means 
that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 12(bK6), 15(a). 28 U.S.C.A. 
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f41 KevCite Notes ^ 
C^IZQA Federal Civil Procedure 
O170AVH Pleadings and Motions 
€^170AVII(E) Amendments 
<^170Ak851 k. Form and Sufficiency of Amendment. Most Cited Cases 
In reviewing for futility of a proposed amendment, as would warrant denial of motion for leave to 
amend complaint, the district court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies to a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rules 12(b)(6), 15(a), 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A. 
|i 
[5] KeyCite Notes 
o*2Z2 Negligence 
0272XIV Necessity and Existence of Injury 
o-272k463 k. Economic Loss Doctrine. Most Cited Cases 
$ 
i^379 Torts KeyCite Notes 
<^379I In General 
c^379k l l6 Injury or Damage from Act 
ow379kll8 k. Economic Loss Doctrine. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 379k5) 
Under Illinois law, the economic loss doctrine, prohibiting recovery of damages for purely economic 
losses in tort actions, applies to the service industry only when the duty of the party performing the 
service is defined by the contract; if the duty at issue arises outside the contract, a tort claim may 
proceed. 
[6] KeyCite Notes ^ 
-JQ170A Federal Civil Procedure 
<^170AH Parties 
<^170AII(J) Defects, Objections and Amendments 
<^iZaAk392 k. Amendments. MosLCitM..Cases 
In action against corporate defendant for breach of contract, negligence and negligent 
misrepresentation, pursuant to Maine law, plaintiff was entitled to leave to amend complaint to add 
negligence claim against two individual defendants, who were professional employees of corporate 
defendant, even though corporate defendant moved for summary judgment on negligence claims 
under economic loss doctrine, where claim for professional malpractice against individual employees 
could exist independent of the parties' contract, under Maine law. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 12(b)(6), 
15(a), 28 U.S.C.A. 
*223 Kurt E. Olafsen, Portland, ME, for Maine Rubber International. 
Daniel Rapaport, Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau, Pachios & Haley, LLC, Portland, ME, for Environmental 
Management Group Inc. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION FOR LEA VE TO AMEND 
DAVID M. COHEN, United States Magistrate Judge. 
The plaintiff, Maine Rubber International, moves for leave to amend the complaint to add two 
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individual defendants and to change the wording of paragraph 6 of the original complaint. Plaintiffs 
Motions to Amend Complaint and to Join Parties, etc. ("Motion") (Docket No. 10) at 1-2 & n. 1. I 
grant the motion. 
The plaintiff seeks to add David Maglietta and Felicia Pfeffer, identified as employees of the corporate 
defendant "at all relevant times," id. at 1, as individual defendants with respect to Counts I and I I I of 
the complaint, which allege negligence and negligent misrepresentation. It represents that these 
counts against the corporate defendant "were based upon the vicarious liability of [the defendant] for 
the actions of" these individual employees, id. at 2, and contends that the motion is filed two weeks 
after the defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment "that made clear the need to clarify 
the pleadings and to join" the individual defendants, id. at 3. 
B 
[11. The defendant objects to the motion, arguing, inter alia, that the request to add the 
individual defendants is merely an attempt to avoid the effect of the economic loss rule, which is the 
basis for its motion for partial summary judgment, in which it seeks judgment on the negligence 
counts. Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint, etc. ("Objection") (Docket No. 
13) at 3-4. Under Maine law, the economic loss rule 
marks the fundamental boundary between the law of contracts, which is designed to enforce 
expectations created by agreement, and the law of torts, which is designed to protect citizens and 
their property by imposing a duty of reasonable care on others. In order to preserve the bright line 
between contract and tort law, the rule prohibits the recovery of purely economic losses in tort 
actions. Economic loss has been defined as "damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and 
replacement of defective product, or consequent loss of profits—without claim of personal injury or 
damage to other property." 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Childs, 52 F.5upp.2d 139, 142 (D.Me.1999) (citations and some internal 
quotation marks omitted). *224 The question whether the doctrine applies to bar tort claims that 
services provided pursuant to a contract were performed negligently is unresolved in Maine law. Id. at 
145-46. 
G3 @ S3 
[2] * [3] " [4] * A motion for leave to amend a complaint may be denied, notwithstanding the 
admonition of Fed.^ RXiyi.P,_..15(.a) that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires," 
if the proposed amendment would be futile. Grant v. News Group Boston, Inc., 55 F.3d 1, 5 (1st 
Cir.1995), 
"Futility" means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted. In reviewing for "futility," the district court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as 
applies to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 
Glassmanjr. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1st Cir.1996) (citations omitted). 
The scheduling order in this case provided that the deadline for joinder of parties and amendment of 
the pleadings was April 16, 2003, Scheduling Order with Incorporated Rule 26(f) Order (Docket No. 4) 
at 1, five weeks before the instant motion was filed on May 22, 2003. The plaintiffs failure to comply 
with the deadline, while cause for concern, is not grounds for denying the motion on its face. In this 
case, it is clear that the plaintiff knew the identities of the proposed individual defendants and their 
respective roles in the matter at issue from the outset; the plaintiff only became interested in these 
individuals as possible defendants after the defendant filed its motion for partial summary judgment 
invoking the economic loss doctrine, raising the possibility that the named defendant might not be 
liable on the plaintiffs tort claims. The plaintiff filed its motion two weeks after this possibility became 
apparent, an acceptable delay under the circumstances. See generally MendaJeMu^ Co, v, 
Rutherford, 178 F.R.D. 1. 2-3 (P.Me.1998V 
The proposed amended complaint merely alleges that the proposed individual defendants are 
professionals; it does not specify their expertise or indicate whether or not they are licensed. Courts 
in other jurisdictions have varied in their treatment of the issue presented here. In Hydro Investors, 
Inc. v. Trafalgar Power Inc., 227 F.3d 8, 17 (2d Cir.2000) (applying New York law), the court refused 
to bar a professional malpractice claim against a defendant engineer who was employed by a 
corporate defendant when the individual defendant invoked the economic loss rule. It held that the 
harm arising from the professional malpractice was distinct from that governed by the contract. Id. In 
Springfield H^ 172.Vt....3n the court held that the 
defendants, former employees of a corporation with which the plaintiff had contracted, could not be 
held liable on a claim that they negligently administered the agreement. The court, reviewing a grant 
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of summary judgment, construed the economic loss rule to bar recovery from individual defendants 
on tort claims in the absence of a special relationship between the alleged tortfeasors and the plaintiff 
and found that no such relationship existed because, "[although appellees' work may have involved 
complex and specialized tasks, it is undisputed that appellees did not hold themselves out as 
providers of any licensed professional service." Id.. 779 A.2d at 72. 
m 
[5] In Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So.2d 973 (Fla.1999), the court held that "the mere 
existence of.. . a contract [for professional services] should not serve per se to bar an action for 
professional malpractice" and allowed a negligence claim to proceed against an engineer who was 
employed by a corporation that had contracted to inspect a house the purchase of which was under 
consideration by the plaintiff. Id. at 974-75, 983. In Tommy L Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. 
Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 320 S.C. 49, 463 S.E.2d 85, 88-89 (1995), the court relied on an 
exception to the economic loss rule applicable where there is a special relationship between the 
alleged tortfeasor and the injured party to allow a claim against an engineer who supervised the 
construction that was the subject of the contract to proceed. The Illinois courts hold that the 
economic loss doctrine applies to the service industry only when the duty of the party performing the 
service is defined by the contract; if the duty at issue arises outside the contract, a tort claim may 
proceed. *225 Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Touche Ross & Co., 159 III.2d 
137, 201 III.Dec. 71 , 636 N.E.2d 503, 514-15 (1994) (allowing tort claim against accountants, 
suggesting that claim would not lie against architect). 
In Businessmen's Assurance _Co._ of Am. y.^Graham, 891 S_.„W.2d 438, 453 (Mo.App.1994), the court 
held that an action in tort may proceed "if the party sues for breach of a duty recognized by the law 
as arising from the relationship or status the parties have created by their agreement." I t recognized 
a "common law duty to provide architectural services in a professional manner." Id. at 454. In 
contrast, in Floor Craft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Parma Cmty. Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 54 Ohio St.3d 1, 560 
N.E.2d 206, 208, 212 (1990), a general contractor sued an architect, and the court held that, "in the 
absence of privity of contract no cause of action exists in tort to recover economic damages against 
design professionals." 
While the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has not addressed this issue, a justice of the Superior 
Court has considered it in some detail. In Pendleton Yacht Yard, Inc. v. Smith, 2003 Me.Super. LEXIS 
49 (Maine Superior Court, Waldo County, Docket No. CV-01-047) (Mar. 20, 2003), Justice Marden 
denied a motion for summary judgment on a negligence claim against a marine surveyor on the 
ground that recovery should be limited to a contract claim against his employer, the corporate 
defendant. Id. at * l - * 2 . Citing a decision of the bankruptcy court for the District of Maine and an 
unreported decision of this court, id. at *9-*10, Justice Marden held that summary judgment was 
inappropriate because there was a genuine issue as to whether any contract existed between the 
plaintiff and the individual defendant and because the individual defendant may have made negligent 
misrepresentations outside the scope of the contract between the plaintiff and the corporate 
defendant, id. at *12-*13. 
B 
[6] Here, the proposed amended complaint alleges only that Maglietta and Pfeffer were 
professionals and, as such, owed a duty to the plaintiff. While it may well become evident at some 
later point that any such duties were within the scope of the contract, that neither Maglietta nor 
Pfeffer was licensed by the State of Maine or that for some other reason neither individual may 
reasonably be held to have a duty extending to the plaintiff that could have been breached under the 
circumstances of this case, at the present time the only issue before the court is whether it appears 
to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be able to recover under any set of facts compatible with the 
terms of the proposed amended complaint, read with every reasonable inference in the plaintiff's 
favor. On that issue, the plaintiff prevails, because I conclude that it is likely that the Maine Law Court 
would find that a claim for professional malpractice may exist independent of a contract under certain 
circumstances, as did all but one of the courts discussed above. At this t ime, it is not necessary to 
determine what those circumstances might be and whether they are present in this case. 
The defendant does not address the plaintiff's requested amendment to the language of paragraph 6 
of the original complaint. No reason to deny the request is apparent; it is granted. 
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs motion to leave to amend its complaint is GRANTED. 
D.Me.,2003. 
Maine Rubber Intern, v. Environmental Management Group, Inc. 
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